Indian and Chinese troops have commenced disengagement at two friction points in the Eastern Ladakh region. Defence officials report that Indian forces are beginning to relocate their equipment to more secure areas in these locations.

This development follows the recent bilateral meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, which marked their first in five years and took place during the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia.

Relations between India and China have significantly deteriorated since the clash in Galwan Valley in June 2020. During the meeting, Prime Minister Modi emphasized that mutual trust and respect are vital for the relationship, while President Jinping stressed the importance of properly managing disagreements and differences.

In addition to his discussions with President Jinping, Prime Minister Modi also engaged in talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, advocating for a peaceful resolution to Russia’s ongoing conflict in Ukraine. President Putin reaffirmed the strong nature of the India-Russia relationship, describing it as a privileged strategic partnership that continues to evolve.

At the summit’s conclusion, leaders adopted the Kazan Declaration, which outlined critical areas for cooperation and a unified approach to various global issues. The declaration addressed a wide range of topics, including geopolitics and advancements in artificial intelligence.

To delve into the key outcomes of the BRICS Summit, CNBC-TV18 interviewed Rajiv Bhatia, Former Ambassador and Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House, and Brahma Chellaney, a Strategic Affairs Expert.

Below is the verbatim transcript of the discussion.

Q: What do you think this BRICS summit reflects about India’s position on the global stage? We were able to have a bilateral meeting with Russia, a bilateral meeting with Iran, a bilateral meeting with China where there was a breakthrough as well. What does this say about India’s position in geopolitics today?

Bhatia: It is no exaggeration to say that India is enjoying what, in golf terms, is called the sweetest part of the geopolitical dynamics today. India’s valid claim to be the bridge between East and West and between North and South stands very clearly showcased in recent international conferences, climaxing in the BRICS Summit. We can say that there was a certain degree of burden we were carrying since 2020 as our relations with China went under serious stress. And now there is a beginning in terms of reducing that stress as well. In short, India is in a good position, not only from the geopolitical angle, but I think in terms of showing leadership to BRICS so that it becomes an even more effective plurilateral body in the years to come.

Q: This was the 16th BRICS Summit and was held in Russia. How do you think this BRICS Summit sent a message to the G7? And also, what was India’s message to Canada, with whom our relations have been deteriorating? You have been writing about how the BRICS has emerged as a very strong alternative to the G7.

Chellaney: The BRICS Summit has become an alternative to the G7. It dwarfs the G7 in demographic and economic terms. But there is also another contrast to the G7. The G7 is led by the US, and it only includes America’s allies, its treaty-based allies. It’s a patron-client framework. The BRICS, by contrast, is based on equality among its member states. Now, if you look at the BRICS Bank, known as the New Development Bank, the idea came from India. The bank, though headquartered in Shanghai, is the world’s first multilateral development bank established and led by emerging economies and whose founding members, the five founding members, despite new countries joining this bank, these five founding members remain equal shareholders in this bank with equal voice. By contrast, at the World Bank, the US is the dominant shareholder with veto power.

The BRICS as an initiative is fundamentally based on equality among its member states. This is what makes BRICS very special. And in fact, what makes it doubly special is that if you look at the post-World War II order, all the major international initiatives since 1945 have come from the US; they have been led by the US. BRICS is the first major non-US international initiative. The BRICS is seen as a platform that can help shape the new world order.

Q: What do you think were the key takeaways from the Kazan Declaration in terms of making this a stronger economic grouping with closer financial linkages?

Bhatia: Kazan Declaration is a very long declaration, 134 paragraphs. There is great stress on promoting and strengthening multilateralism in the world. There is a focus on three verticals in terms of promoting international peace and security, international economic and financial cooperation, and then social and cultural cooperation involving people-to-people exchanges.

On the economic side, I think the one issue that has drawn the maximum attention of international and Indian media is the common BRICS currency. This has been blown out of proportion. All that the BRICS governments can agree at this stage is that local currencies will be used in trade transactions by BRICS countries among themselves and also with other willing partners. Beyond this, the leaders have decided the issue requires further investigation, research and study by the finance ministries of BRICS. And therefore, any progress in that direction will have to be awaited in the months or years to come.

I would like to highlight that while there is undoubtedly the principle of equality that guides the deliberations and decisions of BRICS, there’s a kind of a categorisation that is emerging within the grouping. First of all, there are five founding members, although BRICS began as BRIC when there were only four members, let us say five members, including South Africa. Then five other new members came in after the decision last year at the Johannesburg Summit. And now there is the third category, which is the partner countries. These are not full members, but they would hope that in a year or two or whatever time the governments decide, some of them, if not all of them, would also become members. It’s a kind of graduated scale. And yet, at the same time, the founding members enjoy a special position. And the Indian view is that the views of the founding members must be respected and the decision must be taken through consensus.

Q: Coming specifically to the question of China, there was a breakthrough achieved before the two leaders sat down, finally the shaking of hands led to the disengagement process beginning. Army sources say that it began as of Tuesday. How do you see movement in this direction? Are we now looking at a real breakthrough in the border tensions that began in June 2020?

Chellaney: These efforts toward rapprochement between China and India carry global significance because China and India make up one-third of the global population. Any improvement in relations between these two giants will have global ramifications.

Having said that, the process to end the military standoffs along the Himalayan frontier will be a lengthy process. Right now we are focusing on Eastern Ladakh. We are focusing only on two areas, Debsang and Demchok. There are also other areas where buffer zones were created earlier. Those buffer zones were created largely on Indian territory. We don’t know what will happen in the months and years to come because these buffer zones were temporary, but they have remained in place indefinitely.

We still don’t know, for example, in Debsang, where the Chinese intruded 18 kilometers into Indian territory, whether they will pull back fully to where they were before April 2020, or whether India will be able to patrol at all the points where it was patrolling before April 2020. Disengagement is a good start, but disengagement will have to be followed by de-escalation and finally by de-induction of rival forces. De-induction of rival forces will be quite a difficult process because China has changed facts on the ground. It has built permanent new military infrastructure all along the Himalayan frontier. That infrastructure will remain in place, so de-induction is going to be difficult and may not even happen because you don’t want to take a chance by pulling your troops back because the Chinese have created this permanent infrastructure.

Then we should not forget that even though we are focusing now, especially in the Indian media on Eastern Ladakh, there are standoffs in other sectors. There are standoffs along the Sikkim-Tibet border, and there are standoffs along the Arunachal Pradesh-Tibet border. According to what’s appearing now in the media in India, this understanding over Eastern Ladakh also extends to some extent to the standoffs along the Arunachal Pradesh-Tibet border. Though it’s unclear whether to secure the deal in Eastern Ladakh, India had to make some concessions on patrolling rights to China along the Arunachal Pradesh-Tibet frontier. And that still leaves the issue of the Sikkim-Tibet frontier—whether those standoffs will also be resolved.

The point that I’m trying to make is that it’s going to be a lengthy process. This kind of hype that we’re seeing in the media is a bit misplaced because the last time there was a disengagement agreement between India and China happened in 2017 after a 73-day standoff on the Doklam Plateau, and that disengagement didn’t go well. The Chinese pretended they were disengaging; they withdrew and then they came back. They began building permanent infrastructure, and within three or four months, they occupied almost the entire plateau of Doklam. I hope that this process now will be more fruitful and more positive. But we should be very cautious.